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CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS AND CORPORATE 
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
 
Pursuant to 11th Cir. R. 26.1 and 28.1(b), I hereby certify that the following 
persons constitute a complete list of the trial judge(s), all attorneys, persons, 
associations of persons, firms, partnerships, or corporations that have an interest in 
the outcome of the particular case or appeal, including subsidiaries, conglomerates, 
affiliates and parent corporations, including any publicly held corporation that 
owns 10% or more of the party’s stock, and other identifiable legal entities related 
to a party: 
• Berger, Paul H., attorney for defendant-appellee 
• Coleman, Ronald D., attorney for plaintiffs 
• Consumer Opinion Corp., plaintiff-appellant 
• Goetz FitzPatrick, LLP, attorneys for plaintiffs 
• Juravin, Don, shareholder of defendant-appellee 
• Hurricane Law Group, attorneys for defendant-appellee 
• Kovachevich, Hon. Elizabeth A., trial judge 
• Opinion Corp., plaintiff-appellant  
• Podolsky, Michael, shareholder of plaintiffs-appellants 
• Randazza, Marc J., attorney for plaintiffs-appellants 
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• Randazza Legal Group, PLLC, attorney for plaintiff-appellant 
• Roca Labs, Inc., defendant-appellee 
• Roca Labs Nutraceuticals USA, Inc., alleged alter-ego of defendant-appellee 
• Syrov, Alex, shareholder of plaintiffs-appellants 
 
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 26.1(a), Plaintiffs-Appellants hereby disclose that there 
is no parent corporation or any publicly held corporation that owns 10% or more of 
their stock. 
 
By: /s/ Marc J. Randazza  
Marc J. Randazza
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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
This case alleges violations by Defendant-Appellee Roca Labs, Inc., of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) and other claims that arose after 
Plaintiffs-Appellants had served their responsive pleading to a previously-filed 
defamation action.  The appeal challenges the district court’s determination that 
these claims were mandatory counterclaims to the defamation action and thus 
failed to state a claim necessary to survive dismissal.  Resolution of this issue will 
affect a broad spectrum of cases where new claims arise after responsive pleadings 
have been served.  Plaintiffs-appellants believe that oral argument will assist the 
Court in its consideration of this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Plaintiffs-Appellants filed this lawsuit alleging that (i) Defendant-Appellee 
violated the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) when it sent an improper takedown notice 
to improper parties regarding non-infringing matter; (ii) Defendant-Appellee 
violated the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) when it sent an improper takedown notice 
to assert copyright in its name; (iii) Defendant-Appellee committed an abuse of 
process by use of the improper takedown notice; (iv) Plaintiff-Appellant Opinion 
Corp. was entitled to a declaration that certain matter did not infringe Defendant-
Appellee’s copyright; (v) Plaintiffs-Appellants were entitled to a declaration that 
statements about Defendant-Appellee were non-defamatory; (vi) Plaintiff-
Appellant Consumer Opinion Corp. was entitled to a declaration that it did not 
commit defamation because it was not the speaker of the alleged defamatory 
matter;1 and (vii) Plaintiffs-Appellants were entitled to a declaration that Roca 
Labs Nutraceuticals USA, Inc., was the alter ego of Defendant-Appellee.  See T18 
[Complaint], D.1 pp. 6-17.2  The district court therefore had federal question 
(copyright) and supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338(a) & 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The district court correctly notes that no explicit declaration was requested for 
Count VI.  T47, D.43 at p.4 n.7.  However, the count is styled for declaratory relief 
and, on remand, Plaintiffs-Appellants will seek leave to amend to clarify the relief 
sought, and otherwise includes, as with all counts, the relief sought in the Prayer 
for Relief.  T18, D.1 at pp. 17-18. 
2 “T” refers to the Appendix tab number at which the cited document can be found. 
“D” refers to the district court docket entry number. 
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1367(a). This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because Appellants 
appeal a final order of a federal district court.  See T47 [Order of Dismissal], D.43.  
The final order was entered on August 10, 2015, and the Notice of Appeal was 
filed on August 24, 2015.  See T47 [Order of Dismissal], D.43 and T48 [Notice of 
Appeal], D.45.  Plaintiffs-Appellants assert that the appeal is from a final order that 
disposes of all parties’ claims.  See T47 [Order of Dismissal], D.43. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Whether the district court improperly dismissed Plaintiffs-Appellants’ 
original complaint for failure to state a claim where such claims arose after 
Plaintiffs-Appellants had served their responsive pleading to a previously-filed 
defamation action, where the district court determined that these claims were 
mandatory counterclaims to the defamation action.   
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 As set forth above, Plaintiffs-Appellants filed this lawsuit alleging that (i) 
Defendant-Appellee violated the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) when it sent an 
improper copyright takedown notice to improper parties regarding non-infringing 
matter; (ii) Defendant-Appellee violated the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) when it 
sent an improper takedown notice to assert copyright in its name; (iii) Defendant-
Appellee committed an abuse of process by use of the improper takedown notice; 
(iv) Plaintiff-Appellant Opinion Corp. was entitled to a declaration that certain 
matter did not infringe Defendant-Appellee’s copyright; (v) Plaintiffs-Appellants 
were entitled to a declaration that statements about Defendant-Appellee were non-
defamatory; (vi) Plaintiff-Appellant Consumer Opinion Corp. was entitled to a 
declaration that it was not the speaker of the alleged defamatory matter; and (vii) 
Plaintiffs-Appellants were entitled to a declaration that Roca Labs Nutraceuticals 
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USA, Inc., was the alter ego of Defendant-Appellee.  See T18 [Complaint], D.1 pp. 
6-17. 
i. Course of Proceedings and Dispositions in the Court Below 
On January 14, 2015, Plaintiffs-Appellants filed a seven-count complaint, 
initially in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida.  See T18 
[Complaint], D.1.  Defendant-Appellee filed a motion to dismiss for improper 
venue per Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) or, in the alternative, for transfer.  See T25, 
D.16.  Defendant-Appellee did not raise at that time a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) 
).  Although Plaintiffs-Appellants opposed such motion, the Southern District of 
Florida transferred the case to the Middle District of Florida.  See T29, D.19 & 
T35, D.24.  Following the transfer, Defendant-Appellee filed a second motion to 
dismiss, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 13(a)(1)(A) ),3 asserting that the claims 
were mandatory counterclaims to the matter of Roca Labs, Inc. v. Consumer 
Opinion Corp., et al., Case No. 8:14-cv-02096 then pending in the Middle District 
of Florida.  See T38, D.28.  Plaintiffs-Appellants filed a timely opposition.  See 
T39, D.29 (includes exhibits).  Defendants-Appellants thereupon sought leave to 
file a reply memorandum, which it was permitted to file over Plaintiffs-Appellants’ 
objection.  See T42, D.30; see also T43, D.31; T45, D.34; and see T46, D.38.  On 
August 10, 2015, the district court allowed the second motion to dismiss and issued 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Traditionally, such a motion should have been summarily denied for failure to 
have raised the defense in the first motion.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g)(2). 
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an order dismissing the matter with prejudice.  See T47, D.43.  Plaintiffs-
Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal.  See T48, D.45; see also Fed. R. App. 
4(a).   
ii. Statement of the Facts 
Plaintiff-Appellant Opinion Corp. (“OC”) operates a consumer review 
website.     
Defendant-Appellee Roca Labs, Inc. (“Roca”), purports to manufacture and 
sell a weight loss product.  See T6, Defamation Complaint, Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 15-16.  
Roca is currently the subject of an Order shutting down its business operations, at 
least temporarily, due to unfair and deceptive trade practices.  See  Federal Trade 
Commission v. Roca Labs, Inc., Case No. 8:15-cv-02231-MSS-TBM, United States 
District Court, Middle District of Florida, Docket # 13, September 29, 2015. 
 Roca was initially concerned with the general existence of complaints on 
PissedConsumer.com authored “by John Does” and made demand for their 
removal on June 11, 2014.  See T6, Defamation Complaint, pp. 121-122.  It had 
more specific concern with 11 unflattering statements appearing on the 
PissedConsumer.com website about it and three related statements on Twitter.  T6, 
Defamation Complaint 1-1. at ¶¶ 86 & 88.  By letters of August 4 & 7, 2014, Roca 
demanded that OC remove the statements as defamatory, and it made claims of 
trademark and copyright infringement by virtue of the content on the website.  T4 
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[Complaint], SDNY Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 22, 24 & 25; T9, SDNY Doc. 19-3; T10, SDNY 
Doc. 19-4.  Thus, on August 12, 2014, OC preemptively filed suit against Roca in 
the Southern District of New York, where Plaintiffs-Appellants are organized 
(hereinafter “SDNY Case”), for: (1) declaration of trademark non-infringement, 
non-dilution, and no unfair competition; (2) declaration of copyright non-
infringement; (3) declaration of no deceptive or false advertising; and (4) 
declaration that it is immune from Roca’s claims under Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act.  Id. 
Rather than file a compulsory counterclaim to the SDNY Case, on August 
15, 2014, Roca brought suit against Plaintiffs-Appellants in the Circuit Court of the 
12th Judicial Circuit, in and for Sarasota County, Florida, Case No. 2014 CA 
004759 NC (hereinafter “02096 Case” or “Defamation Case”).  T6, Defamation 
Complaint, Doc 1-1.  Such suit alleged the following counts: (1) violation by COC 
of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUPTA”); (2) 
violation by OC of FDUPTA; (3) tortious interference by COC with contractual 
relationships; (4) tortious interference by OC with contractual relationships; (5) 
tortious interference by COC with a prospective economic relationship; (6) tortious 
interference by OC with a prospective economic relationship; (7) defamation 
against COC for the PissedConsumer.com statements; (8) defamation against OC 
for the PissedConsumer.com statements; (9) defamation against COC for the 
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Twitter statements; (10) defamation against OC for the Twitter statements; and 
(11) for declaratory relief.  Id.  All of the counts related to the then-existing alleged 
statements on PissedConsumer.com and Twitter.  Id.  On August 26, 2014, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants removed the 02096 Case to the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Florida, docketed as Case No. 8:14-cv-02096.  T5 
[Notice of Removal], Defamation Doc. 1.  Subsequently, on September 11, 2014, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants filed their answer and affirmative defenses to Roca’s 
complaint in the 02096 Case.  T7, Defamation Doc. 9. 
Following its answer in the 02096 Case, on September 30, 2014, OC 
amended its complaint in the SDNY Case to include Roca Labs Nutraceuticals 
USA, Inc. (“RLN”) as a defendant and add the following causes:  (5) declaration 
that Roca and RLN are alter egos for purposes of liability; and (6) declaration that 
Roca’s and RLN’s contracts with their consumers that might bar their complaints 
are unenforceable against OC.  T8 [Amended Complaint], SDNY Doc 15.  
While the litigation in the 02096 Case and SDNY Case was ongoing, on 
October 29, 2014, Roca transmitted one or more takedown notices under the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. sec. 512(c).  T18 [Complaint], D.1 ¶ 
12; T16, SDNY Doc. 29-1; T12, SDNY Doc. 25-1.  Roca asserted a copyright 
violation because the PissedConsumer.com website contained a “thumbnail image” 
of Roca’s website, which itself contains an image of Roca’s product.  T16, SDNY 
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Doc. 29-1; T12, SDNY Doc. 25-1.  It also asserted trademark infringement for the 
use of “Roca Labs” in a third-level domain name and URL, e.g. <http://roca-
labs.pissedconsumer.com/product/roca-labs.htm>.  T16, SDNY Doc. 29-1; T12, 
SDNY Doc. 25-1 (emphasis added). 
In response, OC sought leave to further amend the SDNY Case to include a 
cause under 17 U.S.C. sec. 512(f) arising from the October 29, 2014, takedown 
notice.  T11, SDNY Doc. 25.  Although Roca opposed such amendment, it made 
no argument that such a claim should have been brought as a counterclaim in the 
02096 Case.  T15, SDNY Doc. 29.  Ultimately, OC’s request for leave to amend 
was denied on November 25, 2014, without prejudice.  T17, SDNY Doc. 31.  
 Again, while the Defamation and SDNY cases were ongoing, on January 13, 
2015, Roca sent a letter to OC and COC pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 770 & sec. 
770.02, asserting claims for defamation arising from the number of complaints on 
the website and for statements appealing for donations to support OC & COC’s 
litigation defense.  T18 [Complaint], D.1, ¶¶ 14-17; T19, D. 7-1.  The next day, the 
Complaint in this case was filed.  T18 [Complaint], D.1.   
Six days thereafter, on January 20, 2015, Roca sought leave to amend its 
complaint in the 02096 Case, citing as cause the filing by Plaintiffs-Appellants of 
this case, being “a preemptive lawsuit in response to receiving … notice of 
Plaintiff’s potential new claims.” T20, Defamation Doc. 82 at p. 5 (emphasis 
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added).  Plaintiffs-Appellants objected, noting, in part, that such new claims should 
have been directed toward this case or the SDNY case.  T21, Defamation Doc. 93, 
pp. 7-8.  Although leave to amend was allowed, the district court was silent on the 
question of whether the new claims might also have been pleaded in this case as a 
counterclaim.  T22, Defamation Doc. 96.  Roca then attempted to take advantage 
of the leave to amend by filing an amended complaint different from the one it had 
proposed.  T23, Defamation Doc. 104.  The district court ordered that improper 
amended complaint stricken.  Id.  Thereupon, Roca sought express permission to 
file the improper amendment, which the district court denied.  T24, Defamation 
Doc. 108.  Such denial was over Roca’s plea that the “proposed amended 
complaint contains facts not in existence at the time of filing Plaintiff’s original 
complaint”.  Id. (emphasis added by court).  Roca’s amended complaint was thus 
finally filed on March 20, 2015. 4  T36, Defamation Doc. 116.  OC and COC filed 
their answer to the amended complaint on April 15, 2015.  T37, Defamation Doc. 
117.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 In the interim, Roca and RLN contested personal jurisdiction in the Southern 
District of New York, and on February 9, 2015, the case was ultimately transferred 
to the Middle District of Florida as Case No. 8:15-cv-00263.  T2, SDNY Docket 
Sheet; T3, MDFL Docket Sheet.  At no time did Roca answer or set up a 
counterclaim in the SDNY Case asserting the causes in the Defamation Case, 
before or after transfer.  T3, MDFL Docket Sheet.  The SDNY Case was 
voluntarily dismissed without prejudice on March 9, 2015.  T3, MDFL Docket 
Sheet; T28, MDFL Doc. 54. 
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 In its order dismissing Plaintiffs-Appellants’ complaint in this case, the 
district court reviewed the procedural history between the parties.5  T47, D.43 at 
pp. 1-3.  It then reviewed the claims filed by Plaintiffs-Appellants in this case and 
those by Defendant-Appellee in the 02096 Case.  T47, D. 43 at pp. 3-5.  The 
district court went on to note the usual pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 & 
12(b)(6) and the applicable standard of review, but then dismissed that question 
because “Roca does not argue the insufficiency of Plaintiffs[-Appellants]’ 
complaint, but rather the complaint should be dismissed because it is compulsory 
in nature.”  Id. at pp. 5-6.   
The district court then proceeded to assess whether Plaintiffs-Appellants’ 
claims were compulsory under Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a).  Id. at p. 6.  It noted that the 
failure to so file “in earlier litigation constitutes a waiver of the claim.”  Id. at pp. 
6-7, citing Yost v. American Nat’l Bank, 570 So.2d 350, 352 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1990) and Republic Health v. Lifemark Hosps. of Fla., 755 F.2d 1453, 1454 (11th 
Cir. 1985).  In analyzing such question, the district court noted the four-part test set 
forth in Montgomery Ward Dev. Corp. v. Juster, 932 F.2d 1378, 1381 (11th Cir. 
1991): 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Of particular note, the district court considered these matters, which were outside 
the pleadings, without converting to a motion for summary judgment.  See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(d).  Thus, as the district court took notice of the matters in those cases, 
their entire dockets must be considered part of the record, even if the district court 
did not cite all of them.  
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(1) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely 
the same? 
(2) Would res judicata bar the subsequent suit on defendant's claim absent the 
compulsory counterclaim rule? 
(3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff's claim as 
well as defendant's counterclaim? 
(4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? 
 
T47, D. 43.  It then stated that an affirmative answer to any of the questions means 
that the counterclaim is compulsory.  Id. at 7, citing Montgomery Ward, 932 F.2d 
at 1381.  The district court then proceeded only to utilize the “logical relation” test 
set forth in the fourth question.  Id. at pp. 7-9.   
In applying the logical relationship test, the district court again looked to 
Montgomery Ward, which stated: 
A claim has a logical relationship to the original claim if it arises out of the 
same aggregate of operative facts as the original claim in two senses: (1) that 
the same aggregate of operative facts serves as the basis of both claims; or (2) 
that the aggregate core of facts upon which the original claim rests activates 
additional legal rights in a party defendant that would otherwise remain 
dormant.  
 
T47, D.43 at p. 8; Montgomery Ward, 932 F.2d at 1381 (quoting Neil v. S. Fla. 
Auto Painters, Inc., 397 So.2d 1160, 1164 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).  The 
district court noted that “there are strong topical similarities between the parties’ 
causes of action,” stating that each raised general defamation on the website, 
attributes of the statements on the website, and copyright infringement in the use of 
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“roca-labs.pissedconsumer.com.”6  T47, D.43 at pp. 8-9.  The district court further 
erroneously found that “[t]he issues of defamation and copyright infringement 
lying at the heart of Roca’s Amended Complaint [in the Defamation Case] are 
largely the same as Plaintiffs’ Complaint in the current case.”  Id. at p. 9.  Finally, 
it held that “[b]ecause the instant claim revolves around the website 
pissedconsumer.com and whether the content posted rise to the level of 
defamation, it ‘arises out of the same aggregate of operative facts’ making it 
compulsory in nature.”  Id. citing Montgomery Ward, 932 F.2d at 1381.  Thus, the 
district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, holding it was “clear the 
issues raised in this case should have been raised in the [Defamation] case, 
especially after amendment.”  Id. at p. 9. 
iii. Statement of the Standard or Scope of Review for Each Contention 
On appeal, the district court's grant of a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6) for 
failure to state a claim is reviewed de novo. See Freeman v. Key Largo Volunteer 
Fire and Rescue Dep’t, Inc., 494 F. App’x 940, 942 (11th Cir. 2012); Williams v. 
Bd. Of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2007).  The 
factual allegations in the complaint are construed in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff. Lord Abbett Mun. Income Fund, Inc. v. Tyson, 671 F.3d 1203, 1206 (11th 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Roca’s first amended complaint in the 02096 Case is actually silent on copyright 
and the domain name.  Compare T33 [First Amended Complaint], Defamation 
Doc. 114.   The word “copyright” appears nowhere in the document.  Id. 
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Cir. 2012). Under Rule 12(b)(6), dismissal is only proper when, "on the basis of a 
dispositive issue of law, no construction of the factual allegations will support the 
cause of action." Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cnty. Gas Dist., 992 
F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993); see also Allen v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 790 F.3d 
1274, 1277-1278 (11th Cir. 2015). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs-Appellants were previously sued by Roca in Florida state court for 
defamation and related claims, which matter was shortly thereafter removed to the 
Middle District of Florida as the 02096 Case. T6, Defamation Doc. 1-1.  None of 
the claims in the 02096 Case dealt with intellectual property infringement or any of 
the facts that Roca alleges constitute “defamation” in this case. Plaintiffs filed their 
answer in the Defamation Case on September 11, 2014. T7, Defamation Doc. 9. 
On October 29, 2014, Defendant served a bogus DMCA takedown notice. 
T18 [Complaint], D.1 at ¶12.  Defendant again threatened Plaintiffs on January 13, 
2015 with brand new, previously non-articulated defamation claims, based on new 
publications. See T19, D.7-1. As a response, on January 14, 2015, Plaintiffs 
initiated this action. T18, D.1.  After this case’s transfer from the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Florida to this Court Roca filed a motion 
to dismiss for failure state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that 
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Plaintiffs’ claims in this action were compulsory counterclaims under Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 13(a) in the Defamation Case.  T38, D.28. 
On August 10, 2015, this Court granted Defendant’s motion. T47, D.43. In 
reaching its conclusion, this Court ruled that “the issues raised in this case should 
have been raised in the 02096 case, especially after amendment.” T47, D.43 at 9.  
Despite this admonishment from the District Court, Roca had not sought leave to 
amend its complaint in the 02096 Case until six days after the instant case had been 
filed. T20, Defamation Doc. 82.  In order to do what the District Court says should 
have been done, the Appellant would have needed to travel back in time – a 
technological nicety that is not yet at Appellant’s disposal.   
Plaintiffs’ claims in this case stem directly from the October 29, 2014 and 
January 13, 2015 communications from Roca; they arose after the filing of the 
Defamation case and could not have been anticipated at the time the responsive 
pleading was due. There was no “actual controversy” required by Malowney v. 
Federal Collection Deposit Group, 193 F.3d 1342, 1347 (11th Cir. 1999). Thus, 
the claims asserted herein could not have been counterclaims at all, much less 
compulsory counterclaims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) and the subsequent filing of 
the complaint in the instant case was proper. Plaintiffs could not have known on 
January 14, 2015 that such claims could later be filed as a counterclaim to the 
amended complaint in the Defamation case, though the district court determined 
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otherwise since Roca had not yet sought to amend.   In fact, Plaintiffs-Appellants 
were not required to plead the claims as compulsory counterclaims to the amended 
complaint because the existence of this very case made exception under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 13(a)(2)(A).  Nor could they have set up a counterclaim at that time, as the 
district court in the defamation case was no longer permitting new pleadings.  T24, 
Defamation Doc. 108. 
Additionally, the claims are not otherwise compulsory as they fail the logical 
relationship test.  The copyright claims appear nowhere in the Defamation case.  
The defamation claims relate only to statistics and a plea for monetary support that 
are unrelated to the other alleged defamatory content.  Assuming arguendo that one 
or more claims were compulsory, such claims should have been consolidated, 
rather than dismissed, in light of case law.  Thus, the decision should be reversed 
and remanded. 
ARGUMENT AND CITATIONS OF AUTHORITY 
I. Plaintiffs-Appellants Could Not Have Stated Their Claims as a 
Counterclaim 
The crux of the district court’s error results from its failure to account for a 
crucial term in Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1).  That rule states, in relevant part, that "[a] 
pleading must state as a counterclaim any claim that — at the time of its service 
— the pleader has against an opposing party if the claim: (A) arises out of the 
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transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's 
claim." Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1) (emphasis added). Florida procedure parallels 
federal.  Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.170.  “A counterclaim is not compulsory if it does not 
‘exist at the time the answer is served.’” Kellogg v. Fowler, White, Burnett, Hurley, 
Banick & Strickroot, P.A., 807 So. 2d 669, 672 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (citing 
TRAWICK, FLORIDA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 12-3, at 216 (2000 
ed.)); see also TRAWICK at 244 (“[T]he counterclaim must exist at the time the 
answer is served. If any elements of the cause of action have not accrued, the 
counterclaim is not compulsory.”)  The claims of Plaintiffs-Appellants did not 
exist and had not yet accrued in the instant matter at the time they served their 
answer in the Defamation case.   
In their Opposition to Roca’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs-Appellants 
devoted particular argument highlighting for the district court that, at the time they 
filed their answer in the Defamation Case, the claims asserted in this matter did 
not exist.  T39, D29 at pp.  3 & 4-6.  As set forth above: 
1) on September 11, 2014, Plaintiffs-Appellants filed their answer and 
affirmative defenses to Roca’s complaint in the defamation case.  T7 
Defamation Doc. 9; 
2) on October 29, 2014, Roca transmitted one or more takedown notices 
under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).  T18 
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[Complaint], D.1 at ¶ 12; T16, SDNY Doc. 29-1; T12, SDNY Doc. 
25-1; and 
3) on January 13, 2015, Roca sent a letter to OC  and COC pursuant to 
Fla. Stat. ch. 770 & § 770.02, asserting claims for defamation arising 
from the number of complaints on the website and for statements 
appealing for donations to support OC & COC’s litigation defense.  
T18 [Complaint], D.1 at ¶ 14-17; T19, D.7-1.   
Because the January 14, 2015 complaint in this case asserts claims only arising 
from the October 29, 2014 and January 13, 2015 correspondence from Roca, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants cannot be said to have had those claims on September 11, 
2014, when they served their answer in the 02096 Case. 
A. The Copyright Claims were Not Ripe on September 11, 2014 
Plaintiffs-Appellants could not have asserted Counts 1-4 & 7 in their 
Complaint on or before September 11, 2014.  Counts 1-4 sought declarations that: 
i) Roca violated the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) when it sent one or more 
improper takedown notice(s) on October 29, 2014, to improper parties 
regarding non-infringing matter; 
ii) Roca violated the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) when it sent one or more 
improper takedown notice(s) on October 29, 2014, to assert copyright in 
its name;  
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iii) Roca committed an abuse of process by use of the improper takedown 
notice(s) on October 29, 2014; and 
iv) Plaintiff-Appellant Opinion Corp. was entitled to a declaration that 
certain matter that Roca claimed as infringing on October 29, 2014, did 
not infringe Roca’s copyright.7 
In order to obtain declaratory relief, a plaintiff must establish that there is an actual 
controversy present that is ripe for adjudication.  See Malowney v. Federal 
Collection Deposit Group, 193 F.3d 1342, 1347 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Consistent with 
the ‘cases’ and controversies’ requirement of Article III [of the Constitution], the 
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, specifically provides that a 
declaratory judgment may be issued only in the case of an ‘actual controversy.’”)  
Further, as set forth by this Court in Emory v. Peeler: 
the continuing controversy may not be conjectural, hypothetical, or 
contingent; it must be real and immediate, and create a definite, rather than 
speculative threat of future injury.  The remote possibility that a future injury 
may happen is not sufficient to satisfy the "actual controversy" requirement 
for declaratory judgments.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Although Count 7 does parallel a similar claim in the SDNY Case, seeking a 
declaration of alter ego, such only relates to being able to pursue RLN for the 
claims against Roca raised in Counts 1-6.  As it is inextricably tied to those counts, 
and could not be adjudicated were Roca not liable for any of Counts 1-6, it cannot 
be said to have existed prior on or before September 11, 2014, as applied to the 
facts of the case. 
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Emory v. Peeler, 756 F.2d 1547, 1552 (11th Cir. 1985) (internal citations omitted).  
The claims in Counts 1-4 would not have satisfied the “actual controversy” 
requirement on September 11, 2014. 
The first count asserts that the October 29, 2014, takedown notice(s) 
regarding the use of the domain names, URL, and screen shot, was in violation of 
17 U.S.C. § 512(f), as OC made “non-infringing, and fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 
107,” and COC made no use of any such materials. T18, D.1 at ¶¶ 36, 37, 40 & 41.    
Under the “DMCA,” an alleged copyright holder may pursue claims against an 
online “service provide” for otherwise unknown infringement if it first sends a 
notification of claimed infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).  Such notice, which has 
been referred to herein as a “takedown notice,” must be signed by an authorized 
person, under penalty of perjury, and state “that the complaining party has a good 
faith belief that the use of the material in the manner complained of is not 
authorized by . . . the law.”  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i), (v) & (vi).  False notices 
have consequences:  a person who “knowingly materially misrepresents” under the 
DMCA “that material . . . is infringing . . . shall be liable for any damages, 
including costs and attorneys’ fees, incurred by the alleged infringer . . . or by a 
service provider, who is injured by such misrepresentation.”  17 U.S.C. § 512(f).  
Plaintiffs-Appellants alleged in the first count that, on October 29, 2014, Roca 
knew that COC never made use of the material and OC’s use was non-infringing.  
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Since injury and rights under section 512(f) cannot arise until after notice per 
section 512(c) is sent, no actual controversy set forth in the first count could have 
existed on September 11, 2014. 
In similar fashion, there could not have been an actual controversy relating 
to the second count on September 11, 2014.  The second count specifically 
addresses the claim in the October 29, 2014 takedown notice(s) that the use of the 
words “roca labs” in the third-level domain name and a web page name infringed 
Roca’s trademark.  T18, D.1 at ¶¶ 53-56.  Trademark registrants have a remedy 
under the Lanham Act for infringement.  15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).  There is nothing in 
trademark law that makes a claim for trademark infringement a proper subject of a 
takedown notice.  Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1114 with 15 U.S.C. § 512(c).  By 
asserting a trademark claim in the October 29, 2014, takedown notice(s), Plaintiffs-
Appellants alleged that such constituted a material misrepresentation under section 
512(f).  See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 16308 (9th Cir. 
2015). Once more, since injury and rights under section 512(f) could not be 
triggered until after notice per section 512(c) is sent, no actual controversy set forth 
in the first count could have existed on September 11, 2014. 
With respect to the third count, a cause of action for abuse of process under 
Florida law requires proof that: (1) the defendant made an illegal, improper, or 
perverted use of process; (2) the defendant had an ulterior motive or purpose in 
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exercising the illegal, improper or perverted process; and (3) the plaintiff was 
injured as a result of the defendant's action.  See Hardick v. Homol, 795 So. 2d 
1107, 1111 n.2 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).  Plaintiffs-Appellants alleged that the 
October 29, 2014, takedown letter constituted the process that Roca improperly 
used.  T18, D.1 at ¶ 65.  As an action for abuse of process cannot arise until after 
the other party has made “use” of “process,” Plaintiffs-Appellants could not have 
asserted such claim until after October 29, 2014, and certainly not on September 
11, 2014. 
Finally, in the fourth count, Plaintiffs-Appellants sought a declaration as to 
whether the domain name and the use of the thumbnail image were not infringing 
on Roca’s copyright.  T18, D.1 at ¶¶ 73-75.  Once more, these claims arose 
specifically from the October 29, 2014 takedown notice.  Although Roca did make 
similar claims in its August 2014 correspondence, it did not assert these claims, 
though it might have, in the 02096 Case, not even on amendment.8  As a result, on 
September 11, 2014, Plaintiffs-Appellants had no reason to believe there was an 
actual controversy, as opposed to a speculative threat of future injury, since the 
copyright claim was seemingly abandoned.  Emory, 756 F.2d at 1552.  This is 
especially apt as Roca could have amended its complaint within 21 days of serving 
to reflect that copyright claims had been raised in the SDNY Case.  See Fed. R. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 As discussed further below, such copyright claim fails the logical relationship test 
as well. 
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Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A).  It was not until Roca actually began sending takedown notices 
to third parties on October 29, 2014, such as Google, that an actual controversy 
newly arose.  As Plaintiffs-Appellants could not have sought declaratory relief 
regarding the October 29, 2014 matters on September 11, 2014, such could not 
have been a compulsory counterclaim. 
B. The Defamation Claims were Not Ripe on September 11, 2014 
In similar fashion to the DMCA takedown notice related claims, Plaintiffs-
Appellants could not have pursued Counts 5 or 6 on September 11, 2014.9  As set 
forth in the Complaint, T18, D.1, Counts 5 & 6 sought as follows: 
v) a declaration that statements about Defendant-Appellee raised in January 
13, 2015, correspondence were non-defamatory; and  
vi) a declaration that Plaintiff-Appellant Consumer Opinion Corp. was 
entitled to a declaration that it was not the speaker of the alleged 
defamatory matter claimed in the January 13, 2015, correspondence. 
As there was no actual controversy on September 11, 2014, regarding the January 
13, 2015 correspondence, these claims were not compulsory. 
 Roca’s correspondence of January 13, 2015, explicitly stated that it was 
“intended to comply with Florida Statutes Chapter 770 and Sec. 770.02.”  T19, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Once more, although Count 7 does parallel a similar claim in the SDNY Case, 
seeking a declaration of alter ego, such only relates to being able to pursue RLN 
for the claims against Roca in this case, not the SDNY Case.   
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D.7-1.  Although Plaintiffs-Appellants directed the district court to the 
requirements of Florida law, the district court was virtually silent on its operation.  
Compare T39, D.29 at pp. 5-6 with T47, D.43.  There is no question that Fla. Stat. 
§770.01 requires pre-suit notice, not post-suit notice, of a claim for defamation.  
See Gifford v. Bruckner, 565 So. 2d 887, 888 n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) 
(“Compliance with section 770.01, where necessary, is a condition precedent to 
maintaining an action”).  More specifically: 
Before any civil action is brought for publication or broadcast, in a 
newspaper, periodical, or other medium, of a libel or slander, the plaintiff 
shall, at least 5 days before instituting such action, serve notice in writing on 
the defendant, specifying the article or broadcast and the statements therein 
which he or she alleges to be false and defamatory. 
 
Fla. Stat. §770.01.  As the Southern District of Florida recently stated, “Under the 
plain language of the statute, notice must be given prior to the filing of the suit—
and understandably so, as post-suit notice is meaningless, both in concept and in 
practice.”  Tobinick v. Novella, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31884, *23 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 
16, 2015).  Failure to provide such proper notice requires dismissal; amendment of 
an existing claim is not authorized.  Gifford, 565 So.2d at 888 n.1.  The district 
court seemed generally aware of this requirement, stating “Under Florida law, a 
demand for retraction of allegedly libelous material is a prerequisite to an action 
for defamation,” but then failed to give it any heed.  T47, D.43 at p. 2, n.4.  
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 In its January 13, 2015, correspondence, Roca made two new claims of 
statements it asserts were defamatory: 
• statistics shown on the website include that there have been 52 complaints, 
$110K claimed losses, $2.1K average loss, and 0 resolved 
 
• “Roca Labs, through its chief attorney, Paul Berger, believes it can silence 
you through fear and intimidation directed at Pissed Consumer” and “
Roca Labs first sued us.” See <http://www.pissedconsumer.com/static/roca-
labs-fundraising.html>. 
 
T19, D.7-1.  Claims relating to these statements did not appear in the August 2014 
correspondence or in the complaint in the 02096 Case.  T6, Defamation Doc. 1-1; 
T9, SDNY Doc. 19-3; T10, SDNY Doc. 19-4.  It was not until the service of the 
section 770.01 notice that Plaintiffs-Appellants were made aware that such 
statements were potentially defamatory.  Roca then specifically amended its 
complaint in the 02096 Case to assert these new claims.  T33, Defamation Doc. 
114, ¶¶ 39, 87, 129, 151 & 191.  The fifth count of the instant complaint seeks a 
declaration that those two statements are non-defamatory, and the sixth count seeks 
a declaration that COC was not the author of those two statements.  T18, D.1 at ¶¶ 
90 & 102. Plaintiffs-Appellants could not speculate a future injury, let alone know 
of an actual controversy relating to those alleged statements until January 13, 2015, 
such that they could have been pleaded on September 11, 2014.  Since such claims 
were not then extant, they were not compulsory counterclaims. 
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C. The Claims Could Not Have Been Set up in March 2015 
Key to the district court’s fallacy lies in its final sentence, wherein it states 
“the issues raised in this case should have been raised in the 02096 case, especially 
after amendment.”  T47, D.43 at p. 9.  Such appears to have been consistent with 
Roca’s comparison of the complaint in this matter only with the amended 
complaint in the defamation case.  See T38, D.28; see also T46, D.38.  Neither 
Roca nor the district court had addressed the claims in existence on September 11, 
2014; rather they were focused on April 15, 2015, when Plaintiffs-Appellants 
answered the amended complaint in the 02096 case.  T37, D.117.  Such mistakenly 
presumes that the claims asserted in this matter could or should have been asserted 
as a counterclaim on April 15, 2015 (or at some other point after the March 20, 
2015 filing of the amended complaint). 
Plaintiffs-Appellants were not required to plead their causes of action as 
compulsory counterclaims to the amended complaint in the 02096 Case.  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 13(a)(2)(A) specifically exempts such counterclaims, stating “[t]he pleader 
need not state the claim if when the action was commenced, the claim was the 
subject of another pending action.”  This Court has found that “Rule 13(a) literally 
requires that the otherwise precluded claim be pending before the other action was 
commenced, not merely before the judgment in that action was rendered.”  Kaiser 
Aerospace & Elec. Corp. v. Teledyne Indus. (In re Piper Aircraft Corp.), 244 F.3d 
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1289, 1296 n.3 (11th Cir. 2001) (addressing a substantially similar version of Rule 
13(a)).  This claim, the “otherwise precluded claim” was pending on January 14, 
2015, before the amended complaint in the Defamation case, the “other action,” 
was commenced.  See Canon Latin Am., Inc. v. Lantech (CR), S.A., 508 F.3d 597, 
602 n.9 (11th Cir. 2007).  Since this action was pending when Plaintiffs-Appellants 
were required to answer the amended complaint in the Defamation case, the causes 
asserted were excepted from being compulsory counterclaims therein.  As they 
were not compulsory counterclaims, dismissal was reversible error. 
In fact, Plaintiffs-Appellants could not have set these claims up as a 
counterclaim in the Defamation case had they wished to.  The district court 
mistakenly presumed a right to file such a counterclaim.  Prior to filing the 
amended complaint, Roca itself attempted to seek leave to file a second amended 
complaint, but was rebuffed on February 20, 2015.  T24, Defamation Doc. 108.  
The district court in that case highlighted the January 20, 2015 deadline to amend.  
Id. at p. 2.  When Roca sought to amend again after January 20, the court found 
that facts not in existence at the time of the original complaint did not justify 
seeking leave to file after the deadline.  Id. at p. 4.  To set up a counterclaim in 
March or April 2015, Plaintiffs-Appellants would have had to file for leave to do 
so under Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(e) & 15(d).  Because Plaintiffs-Appellants had filed the 
instant matter a week prior to the January 20, 2015, deadline, it is unlikely that the 
Case: 15-13816     Date Filed: 10/05/2015     Page: 35 of 42 
	  - 25 -	  
district court would have granted permission two months later to assert them in the 
02096 case, in light of the February 20, 2015 ruling.  Thus, if the claims could not 
have been raised in the Defamation case, the district court committed reversible 
error. 
II. The Claims Fail the Logical Relationship Test 
There is no logical relation between the claims asserted herein and the 
complaint in the Defamation case.10  In applying the logical relationship test, the 
district court cited to Montgomery Ward, but did not address whether the decision 
was because the same facts were the “basis of both claims” or that the core facts 
“activates additional legal rights” under Montgomery Ward.  T47, D.43 at p. 8.  
Instead, the district court found “topical similarities” because both raised copyright 
and defamation claims that were “largely the same,” where each raised general 
defamation on the website, attributes of the statements on the website, and 
copyright infringement in the use of “roca-labs.pissedconsumer.com.”  T47, D.43 
at pp. 8-9.  Its analysis is faulty.   
First, neither the original complaint nor the amended complaint in the 02096 
raised a question of copyright, let alone use the word “copyright.”  T6, Defamation 
Doc. 1-1; T33, Defamation Doc. 114.  Neither do Plaintiffs-Appellants’ affirmative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Plaintiffs-Appellants acknowledge that Counts 5 & 6 are related to the Amended 
Complaint in the Defamation case, but for the reasons set forth above, note that the 
operative questions is whether, on January 13, 2015, they were logically related to 
the original complaint in the Defamation case. 
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defenses.  T7, Defamation Doc. 9; T37, Defamation Doc. 117.  In fact, the only 
time “roca-labs.pissedconsumer.com” appears in the case is in the Amended 
Complaint at paragraphs 86, 127, 150, 190, 278, & 295 where it incidentally 
appears as part of screen shots relative to the complained-of statements, and in 
paragraphs 35, 36, 92, 164, 165, 204 & 205 where Roca alleges it to be part of 
deceptive tactics.  T33, Defamation Doc. 114.  Roca likens the domain name use in 
paragraphs 164 & 205 to “brand piracy or identity theft” which sounds more in 
trademark than copyright.  T33, Defamation Doc. 114. The complained-of use of 
the thumbnail image in Roca’s takedown notice appears nowhere in the 02096 
Case.  Compare T6 & T33, Defamation Docs. 1-1 & 114, with T16, SDNY 29-1 & 
T12, SDNY 25-1.  As the domain name and thumbnail image were not the 
operative bases of both claims and were not part of the same core of operative facts 
activating dormant rights, especially as it relates to the original 02096 complaint, 
Counts 1-4 & 7 fail the logical relationship test and were not compulsory 
counterclaims. 
Similarly, the defamation claims fail the logical relationship test.  Although 
both claims involve defamation, they are entirely separate.  In its original 02096 
complaint, Roca made no claims regarding the aggregate statistics or the plea for 
support for Plaintiffs-Appellants’ legal defense.  In fact, although the pleas for 
support are mentioned in paragraphs 39 & 129 of the amended complaint, they are 
Case: 15-13816     Date Filed: 10/05/2015     Page: 37 of 42 
	  - 27 -	  
not specifically referenced with respect to any defamation claim and appear more 
oriented toward the claim under FDUTPA.  T33, Defamation Doc. 114.  Roca’s 
own actions tacitly acknowledge that the matters are not related.  The January 13, 
2015 Notice per sec. 770.01 was sent directly by Roca’s counsel to Plaintiffs-
Appellants, not their counsel (their counsel was not even copied on the 
transmission).  T19, D.7-1.  Pursuant to the Florida Bar Rules of Professional 
Conduct: 
In representing a client, a lawyer must not communicate about the subject of the 
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another 
lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, a lawyer may, without such prior consent, 
communicate with another's client to meet the requirements of any court rule, 
statute or contract requiring notice or service of process directly on a person, in 
which event the communication is strictly restricted to that required by the court 
rule, statute or contract, and a copy must be provided to the person's lawyer. 
 
Fla. Bar Reg. R. 4-4.2(a).  Since it was not copied to Plaintiffs-Appellants’ lawyer, 
assuming even that sec. 770.01 required that notice be sent directly to a party, it 
must be Roca’s position that the matters raised in sec. 770.01 were not “about the 
subject of the representation” in the 02096 Case.  Unfortunately, though this was 
raised by Plaintiffs-Appellants, the district court gave no consideration to the fact 
that Roca is estopped from claiming otherwise.  Compare T39, D.29 at p. 6 with 
T47, D.43.  Having failed the logical relationship test, and with the district court 
having considered no other question, counts 5 & 6 cannot be said to have arisen 
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out of the same occurrence.  As they were not compulsory counterclaims, the 
district court committed reversible error. 
III. Consolidation, Not Dismissal, was Appropriate 
Assuming, arguendo, that the claims were compulsory counterclaims, 
dismissal with prejudice was not the appropriate remedy.  In its motion, Roca 
brought to the district court’s attention the following body of law: 
courts have interpreted Rule 13(a) to permit dismissal of the second-filed action 
when this second action should have been brought as a counterclaim in the first-
filed action. Kerr Corp. v. N. Am. Dental Wholesalers, Inc., SACV 11-0313 
DOC CWX, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121063, 2011 WL 4965111, at *3-4 (C.D. 
Cal. Oct. 18, 2011) (finding that a court may consolidate two actions and 
realign the parties when a party failed to bring a compulsory 
counterclaim); Internet Law Library, Inc. v. Southridge Capital Mgmt. LLC, 
208 F.R.D. 59, 63 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (finding that when a party institutes a second 
action based upon a compulsory counterclaim in a still pending action, courts 
can consolidate the two actions and realign the parties). 
 
T38, D.28 at p. 6 (quoting Ironshore Indem., Inc. v. Banyon 1030-32, LLC, 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124542, *19 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2013) (finding such authority 
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a))).  The Second Circuit has approved of such 
consolidation. See Speed Products Co. v. Tinnerman Products, 222 F.2d 61, 68 (2d 
Cir. 1955).  Dismissal with prejudice is an extreme remedy, since Plaintiffs-
Appellants might have otherwise amended the first-filed SDNY case to include the 
instant causes rather than have dismissed that action voluntarily.  Thus, even if the 
claims were compulsory counterclaims, the district court should have followed the 
law presented by Roca and consolidated the matters.   
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CONCLUSION 
 In light of the foregoing, this Court should reverse the district court’s order 
of dismissal and remand for further proceedings. 
      Respectfully submitted, 
      RANDAZZA LEGAL GROUP, PLLC 
/s/ Marc J. Randazza 
Marc J. Randazza 
Fla. Bar No. 625566 
      3625 S. Town Center Drive, Suite 150 
      Las Vegas, NV 89135 
(702) 420-2001 
ecf@randazza.com  
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